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JOHN H. FANNING LABOR LAW
WRITING COMPETITION WINNER
LIBELOUS SPEECH: A SURVIVOR OF UNITED
STEEL WORKERS V. SADLOWSKI?*
The American labor movement provided workers with the hope of match-
ing the economic power and influence of employers in "the battle of trade"'
that set wages and working conditions. Congressional establishment of the
unions' exclusive bargaining authority enabled labor to meet its opponents
with a unified economic weapon the individual laborer could not muster.2 It
also provided an opportunity to test the maxim that "[u]nlimited power cor-
rupts the possessor." 3 American experience with the labor movement
proved that some union leaders would exercise their authority corruptly.4
In the face of increasing evidence of union leader abuses, Congress feared it
had exchanged tyranny of the employer for tyranny of the union.5 The
union threatened rather than achieved the democratic principles Congress
had intended it to espouse.6
In 1959, Congress adopted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act (LMRDA)7 to guarantee union members the right to speak and
* First Place, John H. Fanning Labor Law Writing Competition, Columbus School of
Law, The Catholic University of America, 1988.
1. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
2. National Labor Relations Act, § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982); Levy, Legal Responses to
Rank-and-File Dissent: Restrictions on Union Officer Autonomy, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 663,
666-69 (1981).
3. See William Pitt in FIVE THOUSAND QUOTATIONS FOR ALL OCCASIONS 214 (L.
Henry ed. 1945). In a study of union discipline, one researcher discovered seriously vague
language in roughly 85% of the constitutions examined. These figures suggested that this
vagueness provided unions substantial opportunities to coerce members. Note, The Role of
Outsiders in Elections: United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 384, 393 n.68
(1984).
4. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2318, 2322.
5. Hartley, The Framework of Democracy in Union Government, 32 CATH. U.L. REV.
13, 49-50 (1982).
6. Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MOD. L. REv. 273, 275
(1962).
7. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531
(1982)) [hereinafter LMRDA].
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assemble' and participate equally in the election process.9 At the same time,
Congress attempted to minimize federal interference with internal union af-
fairs.l° The balancing of these competing interests may be most tenuous
where the union alleges its members have libeled or slandered its officers or
institution." The United States Constitution does not protect all false
speech;' 2 arguably, such speech deserves no greater protection in the labor
union context. 3 However, federal courts have routinely tolerated union
members' incautious, hyperbolic, and malicious accusations of union leader
wrongdoing."' In 1982, the United States Supreme Court threatened the
courts' tolerant approach by applying a rational basis test to a union rule
that narrowed the free speech rights of union members.'" In the aftermath
of United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, ' 6 commentators have asked whether the
rational basis test would eviscerate federal protection of members from disci-
pline for libelous speech. 7 The Court has yet to address the question, but
the lower courts continue to adhere to the pre-Sadlowski view of the free
speech guarantee.'"
This Comment will examine the ambiguous legislative history of the La-
bor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act's free speech guarantees. It
will then discuss the broad protection provided to libelous speech. The Sad-
lowski approach of minimal scrutiny will be evaluated, and the argument
will be made that rational basis scrutiny undermines the protections of mem-
bers' dissent. The Comment will argue that, under the LMRDA, the proper
balancing of workers' rights and union autonomy requires protection of even
libelous speech. It will conclude that Sadlowski's narrow holding does not
undermine such protections.
8. Id. § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(2) (1982).
9. Id. § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1982).
10. S. REP. No. 187, supra note 4, at 7, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2318, 2323. The Senate Labor Committee opposed "any attempt to prescribe detailed
procedures and standards for the conduct of union business. Such paternalistic regulation
would weaken rather than strengthen the labor movement; it would cross over into the area of
trade union licensing .... " Id.
11. See Summers, supra note 6, at 287.
12. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
13. Beaird & Player, Free Speech and the Landrum-Griflin Act, 25 ALA. L. REV. 577, 592
(1973).
14. See id. at 592 n.75.
15. United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982).
16. 457 U.S. 102 (1982).
17. See, e.g., Bartosic & Minda, Labor Law Myth in the Supreme Court, 1981 Term: A
Plea for Realistic and Coherent Theory, 30 UCLA L. REV. 271, 318 n.276 (1982).
18. See, e.g., Petramale v. Local No. 17 of Laborers Int'l Union, 736 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984).
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I. LMRDA: A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR UNION MEMBERS
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' 9 affirmatively protected and
encouraged the organization of unions" when "it made the majority union
the sole bargaining agent, vesting in it exclusive power to represent all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit. Employers were not only compelled to bar-
gain with the majority union but also prohibited from bargaining with
individuals or minority groups."2 1 This power, like the legislative power of
an intermediate level of government, "transformed the demand for union
democracy into legislative imposition of democratic standards.,
22
Congress, after extensive hearings to investigate labor union practices,
23
determined that union democracy had suffered at the hands of a few abusive
union leaders who had exercised their exclusive bargaining power for per-
sonal gain24 and in disregard of union members' will. 25 The congressional
investigations culminated in legislative efforts to deter such improper con-
duct by union officials. 26 The reforms were not, however, undertaken to
place unions under federal oversight. Congress continued to recognize the
need for internal union autonomy. 27 Congress expressed its continued sup-
port for the legislative model of union democracy by considering a "Bill of
Rights" for union members.2 8
19. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C.).
20. Summers, supra note 6, at 277.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Note, supra note 3, at 389 n.36.
The Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management
Field held investigatory hearings from 1957 to 1960 to study abuses in the labor field.
The Committee was popularly known as the McClellan Committee because it was
chaired by Senator John McClellan (D. Ark.). During its existence, the Committee
held 270 days of public hearings and amassed 46,150 pages of record. The Commit-
tee heard 1,526 witnesses and issued 8,000 subpoenas. Three hundred forty-three
witnesses declined to answer Committee inquiries by invoking the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. (citing J. MCCLELLAN, CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 208 (1962)).
24. S. REP. No. 187, supra note 4, at 6, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2318, 2322; see also Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526,
536 (1984).
25. Levy, supra note 2, at 680.
26. S. REP. No. 187, supra note 4, at 2, 5, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2318, 2321.
27. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG & ADMIN. NEWS 2318, 2322.
28. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) first recommended adoption of a bill of
rights to protect member rights. Atleson, A Union Member's Right of Free Speech and Assem-
bly: Institutional Interests and Individual Rights, 51 MINN. L. REV. 403, 446 n.109 (1967).
The ACLU Bill of Rights would have "equated the freedom of speech sought by the ACLU
with freedom of speech under the Constitution." Id. at 446 n. 109.
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The first version of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959, however, omitted a bill of rights.29 During floor debate of the
LMRDA, Senator McClellan proposed a bill of rights to assure greater par-
ticipatory democracy.30 The Senate Labor Committee had originally re-
jected this bill of rights, but the full Senate passed it by a single vote.3 The
original version provided every union member
'shall have the right to express any views, arguments, or opinions
regarding any matter respecting such organization or its officers,
agents, or representatives, and to disseminate such views, argu-
ments, or opinions either orally or in printed, graphic, or visual
form, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or interference of
any kind by such organization.'
32
Weak labor union lobbyists3 3 faced the inevitability of the bill of rights but
worked to prepare a narrower provision. Three days after the adoption of
the McClellan bill, the Senate replaced it with the Kuchel proposal.34 After
adoption of the bill of rights, "[t]he central thrust of the [LMRDA] was no
29. Note, Finnegan v. Leu: Promoting Union Democracy by Suppressing Internal Dissent,
32 CATH. U.L. REV. 287, 290 (1982). Senators Kennedy and Ives originally introduced the
LMRDA. Id. at 287 n.2. The original provisions sought to provide "the opportunity to influ-
ence policy and leadership by free and periodic elections" and reporting of union activities. S.
REP. No. 187, supra note 4, at 7, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2318,
2323; see also Summers, supra note 6, at 274; Note, supra, at 290.
30. Note, supra note 29, at 287 n.3, 290.
31. Id. at 287 n.3. "The McClellan 'bill of rights' was adopted by the narrowest of mar-
gins--47-46 with five abstentions." Beaird & Player, supra note 13, at 579. In fact, the Vice
President cast the deciding vote. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 22 n.35, United Steel-
workers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982) (No. 81-395) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
32. Hickey, The Bill of Rights of Union Members, 48 GEO. L.J. 226, 231 (1959) (quoting
105 CONG. REC. 5810 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1959)). One commentator has described the provi-
sion as an unqualified grant of rights exceeding the scope of the federal Constitution. Id at
231.
33. Levy, supra note 2, at 681. The unions may have underestimated the support for labor
reforms. Certainly, they found it difficult to refute the findings of the McClellan Committee
regarding undemocratic procedures. Their prior public support of the ideology of democracy
made strong objections to member rights untenable. These weaknesses may have contributed
to the unions' inability to negotiate a satisfactory compromise. Id.
34. Note, supra note 29, at 287 n.3. Section 101(a)(2) provides in relevant part:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right . . .to express any
views, arguments or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization
his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any busi-
ness properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and rea-
sonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein
shall be construed to impair the right of labor organization to adopt and enforce
reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as
an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its per-
formance of its legal or contractual obligations.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1982).
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longer the prevention of financial malpractices but the protection of union
democracy.",35 The House of Representatives adopted the Kuchel provision
with almost no discussion. 36 The final version, in section 101(a)(2), con-
tained a broad grant of the right "to express any views, arguments or opin-
ions" subject to a proviso permitting unions to "enforce reasonable rules"
promoting member responsibility to the union and performance of union
legal and contractual obligations.37 The quick approval of the bill of rights
provided courts little guidance as to the proper interpretation of the free
speech guarantee and proviso.38
Parallels have been drawn between the section 101(a)(2) free speech guar-
antee and the Bill of Rights.39 However, commentators differ as to whether
section 101(a)(2) actually guarantees the equivalent of federal freedom-of-
speech guarantees in light of the section's proviso regarding union authority
to adopt reasonable rules to regulate speech.' The case law indicates that
first amendment principles influence construction of section 101(a)(2) with-
out controlling the provision's scope.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 101(A)(2)
A. Salzhandler v. Caputo:x Protecting Speech Beyond the Scope of the
First Amendment
The Second Circuit established the broadest reach for section 101(a)(2)'s
protection of union member speech in Salzhandler v. Caputo." In Salzhan-
35. Summers, supra note 6, at 274.
36. Note, supra note 29, at 287 n.3.
37. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1982).
38. Atleson, supra note 28, at 409; Summers, supra note 6, at 284. One commentator has
recommended that courts interpreting the provision "seek out the underlying rationale [of the
statute] without placing great emphasis upon close construction of the words." Cox, Internal
Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MIcH. L. REV. 819, 852
(1960). Others have concluded that "the courts should apply standards analogous to those
used in protecting constitutional rights." Summers, supra note 6, at 284; see also Atleson,
supra note 28, at 404 (noting a "marked parallel between the rights granted and the federal Bill
of Rights"); Beaird & Player, supra note 13, at 580 ("IT]he underlying purpose of Title I is to
equate the voice of union members in the affairs of labor organizations with the voice of the
public in governmental affairs."); Hall, Freedom of Speech and Union Discipline: The Implica-
tions of Salzhandler, 17 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 349, 355 (1964) (quoting 105 CONG.
REc. 6472, 6476, 6478 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1959) (statement of Sen. McClellan)) (" '[W]e
should give union members their inherent constitutional rights and.., protect union members
in those rights.' "); Hickey, supra note 32, at 226; Levy, supra note 2, at 684 ("Congress simply
intended to apply the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution to the activities of the
participants in union government."). But see infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 38.
40. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1982).
41. 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
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dler, a member and financial secretary of Local 442 of the Brotherhood of
Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America had distributed leaflets
accusing the local's president of making derogatory remarks about other
members, converting widows' dues-refund checks, and misappropriating the
local's funds.42 The local's president filed charges against Salzhandler,
under the union's constitution, for libel and slander constituting " 'acts and
conduct inconsistent with the duties, obligations and fealty of a member or
officer of the Brotherhood.' ,43 A five-person trial board found Salzhandler
guilty, removed him from office, and barred him from all participation in
union meetings and affairs for a five-year period.44 Salzhandler filed suit for
nullification of the order, reinstatement, and damages, but the district court
dismissed his complaint because it found his remarks libelous.4" The Second
Circuit reversed and held that "Salzhandler had a right to speak his mind
and spread his opinions regarding the union's officers, regardless of whether
his statements were true or false."
4 6
In deciding the case, the court gave section 101(a)(2) a broader scope than
first amendment protections established in Beauharnais v. Illinois.4' The
Court in Beauharnais, determined that libelous speech urging whites to unite
against blacks was outside the scope of the first amendment.4" The Salzhan-
dler court distinguished the LMRDA free speech protection in light of the
practical realities of union politics.
The court examined the legislative history of section 101(a)(2) of the
LMRDA. It read the provision as a broad protection of all discussion, criti-
cism, and complaint.49 Congress had subjected this broad protection of
speech to two explicit exceptions: the union could establish reasonable rules
relating to members' responsibilities to the union as an institution and to the
union's legal and contractual obligations.5" The court supported its literal
interpretation of the 101(a)(2) proviso with its reading of the legislative
history.5 1
42. Id. at 447.
43. Id. at 448.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 451.
47. 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952), overruled, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
48. Id.
49. Salzhandler, 316 F.2d at 448-49. The role of publicity as a deterrent to wrongdoing
has been applauded by Justice Brennan who calls it "'a remedy for social . . . diseases.'"
Note, supra note 3, at 394 n.73 (quoting L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How
THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1933)).
50. Salzhandler, 316 F.2d at 450.
51. The court viewed Senator McClellan's proposed version as absolute and the enacted
[Vol. 38:155
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In addition, the court's opinion reflected an awareness of the practical
obstacles that face a critic of union activity. The court acknowledged that
Beauharnais left open the question of protection of libelous speech in the
absence of an impartial hearing by a judge.5 2 The court openly questioned
the impartiality of the union trial board where its members appreciated the
institution's concern for unity more than they appreciated "the fine line be-
tween criticism and defamation."53 The Salzhandler court voiced its reluc-
tance to subject each charged party to a de novo trial of the libel claim in
federal court absent congressional intent.54 Union trial boards evaluating
allegations of libel might well have penalized what the court termed " 'over-
stated accusations' " and common " 'vitriol.' ," The court considered the
overbroad application of libel rules a tool to suppress revelations of corrupt
version as a specific listing of exceptions to a broad rule. Id. The court dismissed language by
Senator McClellan that characterized his initial proposal as a qualified grant of rights. Id. at
450 n.8. Senator Kuchel had stated that under his proposal speech would remain subject to
"'reasonable restraints.'" Atleson, supra note 28, at 451 (quoting 2 LEG. HIsT. 1231). Sena-
tor McClellan may have meant that union member speech remained subject to the same type
of balancing as speech protected by the first amendment without implying that all first amend-
ment principles applied under the proviso to § 101(a)(2). Certainly, Senator McClellan voted
for the Kuchel version. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21 n.34, United Steelworkers v.
Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982) (No. 81-395) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
52. Salzhandler 316 F.2d at 449-50 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263-64
(1952), overruled, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
53. Id. at 450. The court's opinion acknowledged that unions generally lack an independ-
ent judiciary to hear disciplinary charges. See generally Hartley, supra note 5, at 68 (discuss-
ing rare instances of independent public review). In addition to their interest in the dispute's
outcome, union trial-board members generally lack legal training, Atleson, supra note 28, at
448.
54. Salzhandler, 316 F.2d at 450. Critics of the Salzhandler decision have emphasized
that the court's line-drawing to protect libel rather than submit constitutionally protected
speech to biased tribunals ignores the multiplicity of difficult issues the tribunals decide. See,
e.g., Atleson, supra note 28, at 469 ("[The line between dual unionism and responsible criti-
cism of union policies is also difficult, yet Congress was aware that union tribunals are com-
posed of laymen."). Indeed, critics question the court's conclusion that Congress did not
foresee de novo federal review of libel disciplinary changes. Id. "After a member has been
disciplined for 'libel,' the court is free to review the facts and determine as a matter of law
whether the statement constituted libel and if so, whether it was privileged." Beaird & Player,
supra note 13, at 592. Nevertheless, the union's ability to discipline where it suspects libel has
occurred provides unions an opportunity to stigmatize critics for legitimate speech. The deter-
rent value of an initial finding of guilt may not be offset by vindication that follows exhaustion
of internal remedies and, perhaps, exhaustion of the charged party. See Atleson, supra note
28, 453-54.
55. Salzhandler, 316 F.2d at 450 n.7 (quoting Summers, American Legislation for Union
Democracy, 25 MOD. L. REV. 273, 287 (1962)). New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), which established a qualified protection of libel and replaced Beauharnais, recognized
that open debate requires protection of some questionable remarks. Id. at 271-72. Atleson has
examined the "overprotection" free speech rights required to secure against overbreadth and
chill of protected speech. Atleson, supra note 28, at 449.
1988]
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union administration. s6
The court rejected the defendants' argument that the section 101(a)(2)
proviso required balancing of the union's interest in preventing false accusa-
tions of union corruption and officer wrongdoing. The defendants had al-
leged that false accusations undermined member support of the union and
weakened the union's bargaining position with the employer." Based on a
narrow reading of the proviso, the court reasoned that Congress had
weighed the need to protect the institution's bargaining position against the
members' speech rights and struck the balance in favor of the members'
rights.58 The court recognized, however, that section 101(a)(2) had not dis-
56. Salzhandler, 316 F.2d at 450-51. Critics point out that judge-bias arguments would
stymie internal adjudication of all disciplinary matters. Sigal, Freedom of Speech and Union
Discipline: The "Right" of Defamation and Disloyalty, 17 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 367,
374 (1964). Indeed, some authors suggest that federal legislation requiring independent trial
boards would better secure union members' rights. Hartley, supra note 5, at 67-68. These
commentators recognize, as the McClellan Committee did, that national officers use their pow-
ers to "curb dissent" and "quiet critics." Id. at 67. Appeals of tribunal decisions at national
conventions rarely meet with success. Id. The union tribunal system often serves "as simply
an additional forum for the exercise of power." Levy, supra note 2, at 668 (footnote omitted).
57. See Salzhandler, 316 F.2d at 450-51. The union's argument that libel of union officers
undermines the institution may exaggerate the effect of the attack. In 1968, the Second Circuit
addressed the issue of whether claims of misappropriation attack the union itself. In Giordani
v. Upholsterers Int'l Union, 403 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1968), the court held that "only officials can
misappropriate funds; therefore the speech, in reality, accused only officials of the union and
not the union itself." Beaird & Player, supra note 13, at 594. Consistent with Salzhandler, the
court rejected the libel complaint as being outside the scope of the § 101(a)(2) proviso. Id.
Critics of Saizhandler's reasoning sometimes agree with its results. For example, Atleson
notes that:
[I]t is doubtful whether the union's bargaining strength was affected. The remarks
were apparently not made in the midst of an organizational or election campaign,
and certainly the remarks did not relate to any such campaign. Furthermore, it is
highly doubtful that Salzhandler, an officer, intended to undermine the union as an
institution as opposed to undermining Webman's position as president. Further-
more, Salzhandler's remarks related to financial irregularities, which like corruption,
were the kind of expression thought crucial by Congress. Whether true or false, a
strong showing of institutional harm should be required to justify punishing this kind
of expression. '[T]he Act was designed largely to curtail such vices as the misman-
agement of union funds, criticism of which by union members is always likely to be
viewed by union officials as defamatory.'
Atleson, supra note 28, at 464 (footnote omitted) (quoting Salzhandler, 316 F.2d at 451); see
also id. at 448 (arguing that protected scope exceeds areas of original congressional concern).
58. Salzhandler, 316 F.2d at 451. The Second Circuit's position seems unequivocal: "the
desirability of protecting the democratic process within the unions outweighs any possible
weakening of unions in their dealings with employers which may result from the free expres-
sion of opinions within the unions." Id. Benjamin Sigal, General Counsel, International
Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, relates the union view of this sweeping dec-
laration as to congressional intent when he questions whether Salzhandler would protect
speech even if it "destroy[s] the effectiveness of the economic unit." Sigal, supra note 56, at
374. Other critics challenge the court's opinion by questioning its conclusion that legislative
[Vol. 38:155
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turbed state remedies for libel.59
Despite criticisms of the Second Circuit's broad view of section 101(a)(2)
and narrow view of its proviso, "Salzhandler has been religiously fol-
lowed."' One of the criticisms of Salzhandler is that its holding ignores
modem developments in libel law. The Supreme Court's decision in New
York Times v. Sullivan6" came after the decision in Salzhandler. Despite its
critical contribution to the body of federal constitutional law relating to li-
bel,62 Sullivan has not significantly affected interpretations of section
101(a)(2).63
B. New York Times v. Sullivan: The Broad View Survives Changes in
Constitutional Libel Law
The Court's decision in Sullivan refined federal constitutional law without
affecting judicial interpretation of section 101(a)(2) protections of libelous
speech. 6 Whereas Beauharnais denied constitutional protection to all
libelous speech, Sullivan recognized a qualified privilege for libel. 65 The Sul-
livan Court required a plaintiff who was a "public official" to prove the
speech was "'of and concerning' the plaintiff" and motivated by actual mal-
ice.66 The Court supported its stringent requirements in light of a compel-
history supports the conclusion that Congress meant only to permit restrictions on member
speech in the two delineated areas. Atleson, supra note 28, at 450, 452.
59. Salzhandler, 316 F.2d at 451.
60. Beaird & Player, supra note 13, at 592 (citing Fulton Lodge No. 2, IAM v. Nix, 415
F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307 (9th
Cir. 1965); Cole v. Hall, 339 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1965); Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp. 525
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Sheridan v. Liquor Salesman Local 2, 303 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Archibald v. Operating Eng'rs Local 57, 276 F. Supp. 326 (D.R.I. 1967); Gartner v. Soloner,
220 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Stark v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 219 F. Supp. 528 (D.
Minn. 1963)). Courts that have been willing to draw a line with the § 101(a)(2) proviso have
required proof that the union itself suffered. Id. at 594. Unions have not found reliance on the
proviso provides an effective ground for discipline of member libel. Id.
61. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
62. Sullivan overruled Beauharnais, and created a qualified privilege for libel.
63. Beaird & Player, supra note 13, at 592-93 & n.76 (citing Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777
(2d Cir. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Giordani v. Upholsterers Union, 403
F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1968); Cole v. Hall, 339 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1965); Archibald v. Operating
Eng'rs Local 57, 276 F. Supp. 326 (D.R.I. 1967)) (courts apply Salzhandler and ignore Sulli-
van even where actual malice is proven).
64. Id. at 592-93.
65. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
66. Id. at 267. The definition of public official in Sullivan and its progeny poses no prob-
lem for the union member who libels an elected union official such as the local president in
Salzhandler. See id. at 283 n.23. Nor should it restrict application of Sullivan to a candidate
for union office. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971) (candidate for
elective office is public official). One area of concern may be the matter of the appointed union
official. Appointees are neither elected, as in Sullivan, nor candidates as in Monitor Patriot.
1988]
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ling state interest in " 'the opportunity for free political discussion' "67 that
is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that may ... well include vehe-
ment, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials."68 The concerns the Court expressed mirror the concerns of
the Salzhandler court that " 'vitriol and calumny' " require protection in the
context of union debates.69 The Sullivan Court noted that false statements
may require protection to give debate the "'breathing space'" it requires to
thrive.7° In the labor context, this protection may require even greater
breathing space because union debates are characteristically heated and
often vulgar. 1 As in Salzhandler, the Sullivan Court recognized that draw-
ing the lines too narrowly creates an incentive for people to " 'steer far wider
of the unlawful zone,' ,72 dampening debate.73 The Court acknowledged
that the line between protected and unprotected speech remains indistinct
and emphasized the Court's need to "in proper cases review the evidence to
make certain that those principles have been constitutionally applied."74
Based on observations that section 101(a)(2) imitates the Bill of Rights, it
seems reasonable to apply Sullivan in LMRDA libel situations." Although
courts have yet to explicitly reject Sullivan in that context, they continue to
apply Salzhandler's broader protections.76 Those who advocate application
of the Sullivan test recognize its capacity for favoring union discipline.
However, Atleson argues that Sullivan's holding would not change the result
However, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), may shed light on this question where it
points out that "speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government." Id. at 74-75. Garrison emphasized that criticism of an official's conduct
of business was of public concern. Id. at 76-77.
The Court's definition of actual malice in Sullivan encompasses knowingly false and reck-
lessly false statements. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
67. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
68. Id. at 270 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)).
69. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 450 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 375 U.S. 946
(1963) (quoting Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MOD. L. REV. 273,
287 (1962)). Segments of the Painters' union have a history of hard-fought battles and internal
disputes likely to produce a plethora of "libel and slander" claims in the absence of a rule such
as the one in Salzhandler. Under these circumstances, "heated or 'fighting' words" may have
little impact on the institution. Atleson, supra note 28, at 462-63.
70. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
71. Semancik v. UMW, 466 F.2d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 1972) ("[L]anguage which would
otherwise be characterized as extremely robust is often an accepted part of union life.").
72. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 285.
75. See Beaird & Player, supra note 13, at 592.
76. Id. at 593.
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if applied in the Salzhandler context."" He argues that the Sullivan rule for
public officials analogizes well to union officials and would protect many
libelous remarks.7" He also suggests extending the public official analysis to
union policy questions because the same values warrant free and open debate
in that area.79 Beaird and Player suggest that application of Sullivan princi-
ples in section 101(a)(2) cases would parallel the National Labor Relations
Board's (NLRB) application of Sullivan in libel claims between employers
and unions under the NLRA. °
Despite these arguments, Sullivan and the NLRB case law do not resolve
the Salzhandler court's concern that a biased and untrained tribunal will
exercise its discretion to limit criticism and dissent. Even the NLRB anal-
ogy seems unpersuasive because the Board offers parties a full hearing before
an impartial administrative law judge."1 Additionally, in the NLRB con-
text, a successful party must file a federal suit in appellate court to enforce
the NLRB's order.8 2 In contrast, imposition of union discipline precedes
judicial review." A court may later overturn wrongful disciplinary action,
but the interim effects of such action may stigmatize the union member, chil-
ling the dissent of other members.8 4 In Salzhandler's case, the union notified
him of his removal from office at the same time it notified other union mem-
bers, thereby sending them the same harsh message.8" The exclusion of
Salzhandler from attendance and participation at all union meetings for a
five-year period could effectively silence critics of an election, a dues vote, or
a contract renewal whether or not the member later returned, vindicated of
the charge.8 6 Member apathy makes it unlikely that the absent union mem-
ber will keep an issue alive. The one-party nature of union politics serves to
disenfranchise dissenters unable to keep their message before the
membership.7
77. Atleson, supra note 28, at 447.
78. Id. at 448-49 & n.118.
79. Id. at 449 n.18.
80. Beaird & Player, supra note 13, at 591 (discussing Linn v. United Plant Guard Work-
ers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)).
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
82. Id. § 160(e).




86. See generally id. at 450.
87. Levy, supra note 2, at 670. In a "one-party" system, incumbents command the re-
sources to avoid many challenges to their authority. Incumbents command all of the forums
of power within the union, permitting them to use disciplinary proceedings to carry out their
objectives. See Note, supra note 29, at 308-09. They also control the means to communicate
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Another criticism of Salzhandler after Sullivan is that Sullivan's recogni-
tion of a qualified libel privilege recognizes the valid, compelling interests of
the victim of libel.88 Detractors argue that "unions do have a valid institu-
tional interest in preventing libel of officials, particularly when the remarks
meet the actual malice standard. ' , 9 This argument remains subject to the
Second Circuit holding that libel of a union official is not libel of the union as
an institution. 9' As the Court opined in Sullivan, injury to official reputa-
tion does not justify suppression of speech any more than does factual er-
ror.91 The impartial application of Sullivan would only produce a different
result in those cases where the union proved actual malice.
Another criticism of Salzhandler is that its emphasis of state libel reme-
dies improperly ignores congressional support of an independent union tri-
bunal. As the Second Circuit noted in another LMRDA case, "[t]he
congressionally approved policy of first permitting unions to correct their
own wrongs is rooted in the desire to stimulate labor organizations to take
the initiative and independently to establish honest and democratic proce-
dures."92 In fact, the Second Circuit has expressed appreciation for the val-
uable assistance union tribunals' decisions provide.9" Despite such views,
the Salzhandler approach better meets the LMRDA goal of limiting federal
interference in union affairs by removing malice claims from the union's
purview. 94
Although Sullivan has reformed first amendment treatment of libel, it has
yet to influence section 101(a)(2). It seems that judicial concerns about
union tribunal fairness continue to warrant judicial review of all union libel
cases.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SECTION l0l(A)(2) PROVISO
A. United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski Providing for the Proviso
By far, the most threatening challenge to Salzhandler's protection of mali-
ciously libelous speech is the 1982 case of United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski. 9
only that information they want members to have and to withhold that which provides them
no advantages. Note, supra note 3, at 392.
88. Comment, "Outsider" Contributions to Union Candidates: United Steelworkers v.
Sadlowski, 68 IOWA L. REV. 831, 843 (1983).
89. Id. at 841 (footnote omitted).
90. See supra note 57.
91. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
92. Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 929 (1961) (citation omitted).
93. Id.
94. Summers, supra note 6, at 279; see also Atleson, supra note 28, at 463.
95. 457 U.S. 102 (1982). The Court's decision was five to four. Id. at 102.
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In Sadlowski, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the section
101(a)(2) proviso in the context of deciding whether unions could bar the use
of nonmember campaign contributions.96 The Court gave the proviso its
broadest reading when it upheld the union's regulation under a rational basis
test.
97
In Sadlowski, the Court upheld a union rule prohibiting union candidates
from accepting campaign contributions by nonmembers.98 The Court re-
jected arguments that nonmember contributions provided essential support
to insurgents, and accepted the argument that the union's goal of preventing
nonmembers' interference with union activities was reasonable. 99 The Sad-
lowski Court developed a two-part analysis of section 101(a)(2) issues: first,
does the union rule interfere with a protected free speech interest; and, sec-
ond, if so, is the rule reasonable under the proviso." ° In supporting this
analytical framework, the Court evaluated section 101(a)(2)'s legislative his-
tory. Unlike the Salzhandler court, however, the Sadlowski Court recog-
nized a more equivocal commitment to provide union members with" 'some
of the freedoms ... that we enjoy as citizens by virtue of the Constitution of
the United States.' ,,o The critical aspect of the Court's opinion was its
handling of the second prong of the analysis. The Court contrasted first
amendment strict scrutiny review with the union context's reasonability
test."° Thus, the Court ruled that "there is absolutely no indication that
Congress intended the scope of § 101(a)(2) to be identical to the scope of the
First Amendment."'0 3 The Court concluded that the language of the sec-
tion 101(a)(2) proviso reinforced its analysis of congressional intent. 04 In-
congruously, the Court continued its analysis assuming that its reading
comported with the democratic ideals Congress envisoned for labor un-
ions.' 0 This assumption ignored the likelihood that a union would provide
96. Id. at 104.
97. See id. at 104, 111.
98. Id. at 104-05.
99. Id. at 111-19.
100. Id. at 111.
101. Id at 110 (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 6472 (1959), 2 LEGIS. HIsT. 1098) (statement of
Sen. McClellan) (emphasis added). The Court noted that first amendment principles helped in
construing the first prong of the test but did not control in interpreting § 101(a)(2). Id. at I11.
102. Id. at 111.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The Court indicated that Congress had emphasized the need "to discuss union poli-
cies and criticize the leadership without fear of reprisal" but that it had emphasized these
rights "in the context of election campaigns." Id. at 112. Nevertheless, the Court applied the
rational basis test in an election context because Congress had intended the proviso "to ensure
that the scope of the statute was limited by a general rule of reason." Id. at 111 n.4.
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a satisfactory purpose for any rule it promulgated.10 6 As with most applica-
tions of the rational basis test,' 7 the Court found the union rule "reasonably
related to the protection of the organization as an institution."' 08
Unlike Salzhandler, which interpreted section 101(a)(2), Sadlowski turned
on interpretation of the proviso. The Sadlowski holding broadly protects
unions and arguably makes irrelevant holdings such as Salzhandler which
broadly define protected rights.'°9 This result does not satisfy the congres-
sional intent behind the "reasonable rules" proviso." 0 Had Congress in-
tended to pass such inadequate protection of union member rights, it would
not have passed the Kuchel proposal, without debate, barely three days after
the passage of the McClellan version."' Neither would the provision have
received McClellan's support." 2 Additionally, a Congress committed to
protecting institutional interests would have required the Secretary of the
Department of Labor to enforce union members' complaints of reprisal for
106. Levy, supra note 2, at 693-94.
107. Comment, supra note 88, at 845. Most applications of a rational basis test "tend to
lead inevitably to the same result, any union rule will meet the standard, and the substantive
rights protected by the main part of section 101(a)(2) in fact will not be protected." Id. (foot-
note omitted).
108. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 112. "A rational basis standard requires that the means used
be rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate interest." Comment, supra note 88, at
834. The union alleged it "adopted the rule because it wanted to ensure that nonmembers do
not unduly influence union affairs." Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 115. The Court determined that
purpose satisfied congressional intent in passing the LMRDA. Id. at 116. In addition, the
Court noted that "the interference with interests protected by § 101(a)(2) is only partial." Id.
at 114 n.7.
109. See supra note 107.
110. See supra note 34. One author's examination of the legislative history suggests propo-
nents of the Kuchel version assured the McClellan supporters this result would not occur.
Comment, supra note 88, at 844-46. But see id. at 846 (arguing that Congress did intend
"broader exceptions" when it adopted the Kuchel amendment to better protect institutional
interests); see also id. at 847-49 (recommending use of an intermediate scrutiny in § 101(a)(2)
cases). The Sadlowski view suggests that the legislative intent behind the LMRDA was to
increase union authority over members, not union member rights. This view is at odds with
the statements of the bill's proponents. See Note, Local 82, Furniture Moving Drivers v.
Crowley: A Restatement of Institutional Power Under Titles I and IV of the LMRDA, 34
CATH. U.L. REV. 181, 182 n.6 (1984).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
112. See supra note 51. When Senator McClellan referred to the need for reasonable limits
he referred to the type of limits "'relating to equal rights and free speech and assembly ...
implicit in the bill of rights as originally drafted, just as [they are] implicit in the Bill of Rights
in the Federal Constitution to prevent abuses.'" Atleson, supra note 28, at 451 (quoting 2
LEG. HIST. 1294 (statement of Sen. McClellan)). These limits, by analogy to first amendment
limits, would have to survive strict scrutiny analysis. See United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski,
457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982).
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critical speech.' 13 The Secretary likely would have provided a more sup-
portive review than the courts have provided to date.' 14 Instead, Congress
gave members a private right of action to more effectively enforce their
rights.' 1 5 In addition, the overlap of title I and title IV protections of elec-
toral freedom may indicate "a legislative consensus that union members
might need strong protections to deal with their unions."
116
While the Sadlowski decision has suffered criticism, it has also received
praise. These commentators focus on the union as an army with discipline
and order needs that supercede individual liberties. As an army, "[t]he
union must be able to maintain a unified front at crucial periods ... to
prevent employers from taking advantage of a split in the employees'
ranks."117 Under this view, criticism of the union or its representatives "im-
pairs the effectiveness of the officers and the prestige of the union.""' False
claims against union officers "during organization, strikes, or bargaining can
have disastrous consequences."" 9
The bases for these arguments for unity may also undermine the argu-
ments for applying Sadlowski to union libel cases. As the Senate Labor
Committee noted, a congressional grant of exclusive bargaining power car-
ries with it responsibility to minimize abuses of power.' 2° If unions crush
113. The original version of § 101(a)(2) called for the Secretary's enforcement. Hall, supra
note 38, at 356.
114. See infra note 115.
115. Atleson, supra note 28, at 405. Labor Department enforcement of titles III and IV
has not been energetic. Hall, supra note 38, at 356. Thus, the Kuchel version enhanced dem-
ocratic guarantees through improved enforcement. Id. at 356-57. It is inconsistent with such
reform to make the rights protected meaningless. Some Members of Congress supported the
measure because private suits would accomplish the goal of limiting "federal interference with
the internal affairs of labor unions." Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467
U.S. 526, 537 n. 12 (1984). This development supports the Salzhandler court's conclusion that
Congress had already struck the balance of individual and institutional interests when it
adopted the LMRDA. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 946 (1963). Professor Summers has noted that the final version of § 101(a)(2) balances
congressional support for member rights and union autonomy:
The law, by protecting democratic rights within the union, not only adds to the
members' freedom, but also reinforces the union's claim to remain free, for its deci-
sions are validated by the democratic process. The statute does not open the door to
further intervention but rather safeguards autonomy by giving union self-government
added legitimacy.
Summers, supra note 6, at 300.
116. Note, supra note 110, at 200. It makes more sense to view titles I and IV as partially
duplicative than to view them as inconsistent.
117. Comment, supra note 88, at 836; see also Note, supra note 3, 388 n.33.
118. Sigal, supra note 56, at 373.
119. Atleson, supra note 28, at 459.
120. S. REP. No. 187, supra note 4, at 8, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2318, 2324.
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diverse viewpoints and tyrannize their members121 they may silence insur-
gents only to allow the institution to suffer a more serious loss of support in a
crisis. 122 As one commentator has noted, democracy has seldom slowed the
army in a crisis. 123 Until unions support the view that union democracy
detracts from their ability to negotiate better contracts for their members,
their objections to worker freedoms do not persuade.' 24
In the aftermath of Sadlowski, the Salzhandler broad view of member
rights has not lost its support among the lower federal courts. Two years
after Sadlowski, the Second Circuit again considered the section 101(a)(2)
protection of slander and held it was protected by the LMRDA bill of
rights. 125
B. Slander and Libel After Sadlowski Applying the
Salzhandler Principles
In Petramale v. Local No. 17 of Laborers International Union, 126 the Sec-
ond Circuit reviewed union disciplinary action against a member who made
slanderous accusations against the union.127 The union's trial board found
Petramale guilty, fined him $1500, and barred him from meeting attendance
for ten years. 128 The court reiterated its opinion that "criticism of union
officers, even when it amounts to slander, is protected speech under the
LMRDA."'129  The Petramale court recognized union authority to adopt
reasonable rules, but it barred discipline unless a member actually disrupted
a meeting. 130 The court found that the union had disciplined Petramale for
his criticism, not his disruption of the meeting, making his words "an indis-
121. Atleson, supra note 28, at 459.
122. Hall, supra note 38, at 365. "Protected in its democratic rights, an insurgent rank-
and-file may yet save and revitalize the labor movement. But if its rights are crushed under
bureaucratic oppression neither it nor any other force can keep the unions alive." Id.
123. Hartley, supra note 5, at 95.
124. Cf id. at 101 ("[T]he objections to union democracy and governmental intervention
fail to establish its undesirability.").
125. Petramale v. Local No. 17 of Laborers Int'l Union, 736 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1087 (1984).
126. Id.
127. Petramale called union elections "corrupt and fixed" and accused union officers of
causing violence at union meetings. Id. at 15.
128. Id. at 16.
129. Id. The court went on to hold that "when union discipline is imposed on the basis of a
combination of factual allegations an essential element of which is protected speech, the disci-
pline as a whole is invalid under the LMRDA." Id.
130. Id. at 17. The court remarked that election disputes "fraught with tension" could be
expected to erupt in angry and incautious speech. Id. The union's reasonable interests in
maintaining order and discipline at meetings did not justify discipline based on members' criti-
cism. Id
[Vol. 38:155
Libelous Speech and Sadlowski
pensable element" of the charge.' 31 As a result, the court voided the penal-
ties imposed. The court never referred to Sadlowski's interpretation of the
section 101(a)(2) proviso.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in Nelson v.
International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Work-
ers, 132 also upheld the broad view of section 101(a)(2) and cited both Pe-
tramale and Sadlowski in the same decision.1 33 In Nelson, the court granted
summary judgment to a member disciplined under a union constitutional
provision designed to "prevent scurrilous attacks on the reputation of union
officials."1 34 The court acknowledged that Congress intended the LMRDA
"to inject a minimal amount of democracy into union politics"' 35 but upheld
the broad view of the section 101(a)(2) protections that would protect even
malicious libel.' 36 Similarly, in Rivera v. Feinstein,'3 7 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York recognized Petramale as
"well settled law."' 38 Examination of other post-Sadlowski libel and slander
cases does not explain the apparent conflict between Salzhandler and Sad-
lowski Nevertheless, the cases may be distinguished.
Two factual distinctions between Sadlowski and Salzhandler suggest that
Sadlowski does not overrule Salzhandler and its progeny. First, Sadlowski
did not involve union regulation of member speech protected by section
101(a)(2). The LMRDA bill of rights extends its guarantees only to mem-
bers. ' Yet in Sadlowski the "speaker" whose voice is silenced is the non-
member whose political contribution influences union affairs.' 4° As the
union argued, Congress intended to protect members' speech even if they
offered it outside the union's hall, "[b]ut it does not follow from the fact that
Congress sought to free union members to discuss union affairs with their
'neighbors' that Congress also sought to grant these 'neighbors,' i.e., non-
members, the right to participate in the election of the union's officers."' 4 '
131. Id. at 18.
132. 680 F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C. 1988).
133. Id. at 21, 23.
134. Id. at 21.
135. Id. at 22 n.7 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 21.
137. 636 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
138. Id. at 162.
139. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(2) (1982); see also Comment, supra note 88,
at 840 (arguing the Sadlowski Court need not have reached the proviso prong of its analysis).
140. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) (per curiam).
141. Petitioner's Brief for a Writ of Certiorari at 19 n.28, United Steelworkers v. Sadlow-
ski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982) (No. 81-395) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file). The ban on non-
member contributions did not restrict a member's associational rights because nonmembers
could still provide support and advice to their candidate.
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Political contributions express the contributor's views by affecting "the
number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached," '42 while the candidate's speech is his "transformation of
contributions into political debate."' 143 The union rule in Sadlowski argua-
bly did not restrict the candidate's right to transform monies received, be-
cause it focused only on the contributor's act of communication. If the
Sadlowski Court incorrectly treated the nonmember's speech under section
101(a)(2), its discussion of the proviso may not apply to other free-speech
cases. "By definition, a proviso only excepts conduct prohibited by the main
provision; if the conduct does not fall within the main provision, an excep-
tion is unnecessary." 144
Additionally, Salzhandler involved content regulation because the union
disciplined members only for "'conduct unbecoming a member,'" "'...acts
detrimental to' " union interests, and " 'libeling and slandering'" members
or officers. 145 The union made no content-neutral accusations against Salz-
handler. As the Second Circuit noted in Petramale, the LMRDA permits
reasonable rules against disruption of meetings, but prohibits application of
rules against slander or critical speech.1 46 This situation contrasts sharply
with the one in Sadlowski where the union limited all nonmember contribu-
tions without reference to their content. 47
Several courts have decided content-regulation issues with similar concern
that the union rule apply neutrally to supportive as well as critical member
speech. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, which applies Salzhandler and Petramale in libel and slander cases,
142. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. The Buckley Court determined that federal election contri-
bution limitations do not significantly hinder public debate. Id. at 29. Of course, the Court
considered the rights of eligible voters, not of nonmembers, ineligible to debate or vote on
union matters.
143. Id. at 21.
144. Comment, supra note 88, at 840.
145. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963)
(citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
146. Petramale v. Local No. 17 of Laborers Int'l Union, 736 F.2d 13, 17-18 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984).
147. See generally United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982). In Buckley v.
Valeo, the Court described federal election contribution limits as neutral to "the ideas ex-
pressed by persons or groups subject to its regulations." 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1975) (per curiam).
The Court hesitated to invalidate "evenhanded restrictions," id. at 31, "[a]bsent record evi-
dence of invidious discrimination." Id. As in Sadlowski, the Buckley Court noted that incum-
bents sometimes lose to minority challenges. Id. at 32; see also United Steelworkers v.
Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1982). One distinction between Buckley and Sadlowski is
that the Buckley Court recognized that the contribution limitation aids minority-party chal-
lengers. 424 U.S. at 33. It is not seriously contended that a nonmember contribution ban
helps challengers based on the superior staff and resources available to incumbents in the union
context.
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nevertheless applied the Sadlowski two-part analysis in Roman v. New York
State United Teachers, '48 to uphold a union rule barring political advertise-
ments in its union newspaper.149 The plaintiffs objected under section
1.01(a)(2) to the union's refusal to run their advertisement, urging the union
to "support [nonintervention] in Nicaragua."' 5 ° In applying the Sadlowski
test, the court noted that the "advertisement has no relationship to any inter-
est of the union or its members, but rather concerns an issue of international
politics."'' Additionally, the union's policy avoided divisive controversy
on nonunion matters.' 52 Thus, as in Sadlowski, the court upheld the "par-
tial interference with ... speech" based on its reasonableness.' 53
The Sixth Circuit applied strict scrutiny analysis to overturn a union's
decision not to publish an advertisement opposing union-supported ratifica-
tion of a contract. In Knox County Local, National Rural Letter Carriers'
Association v. King, " the court required the union to publish a dissenting
view even though application of first amendment theory would not require a
newspaper "to publish any information submitted by an outsider.'" 55 The
fact that distinguishes Knox County from Roman was the Sixth Circuit's
finding that the union newspaper had based its decision on the critical con-
tent of the advertisement. 156 The decision in Knox County also emphasized
the need to apply first amendment principles rather than the entire body of
first amendment law.' 7 This view of section 101(a)(2) comports with the
broad view of section 101(a)(2) in Salzhandler. 5 ' These holdings and the
holding in Sadlowski seem to indicate that section 101(a)(2)'s proviso per-
mits the union to adopt reasonable, content-neutral restrictions on union
member speech. If that interpretation is valid, it is not inconsistent with
Salzhandler's view of section 101(a)(2), which protects critical speech even if
it would be unprotected under the first amendment. If Sadlowski addresses
only content-neutral regulation of speech and courts continue to apply it
narrowly, the result in Sadlowski may be consistent with Salzhandler despite
the broad sweep of the reasoning in Sadlowski.
148. 655 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
149. Id. at 424-25.
150. Id. at 423.
151. Id. at 424.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 425.
154. 720 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1984).
155. Id. at 939.
156. Id. at 940.
157. Id.
158. Compare id. at 938-39 with Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 448-49 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The National Labor Relations Act gave labor unions an exclusive
franchise to negotiate contracts for employees. In passing the Act, Congress
recognized that individual employees lacked the economic power to other-
wise protect their interests. Unions have argued that effective discharge of
their responsibilities requires them to act as a unified body, free from the
negative influences of dissenters and critics. As a result, unions adopted pro-
visions that prohibited many expressions of criticism and dissent by mem-
bers. Faced with mounting evidence of undemocratic practices and
corruption,- Congress passed a bill of rights for union members. The 1982
decision in United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski has threatened the dissenters'
freedoms under the LMRDA by employing a rational basis test in reviewing
union discipline. Despite the ominous portent of this decision, courts con-
tinue to protect even the malicious, libelous speech the first amendment does
not protect. In doing so, these courts recognize that, absent such protection,
unions' discipline might silence critics and compromise the values the exclu-
sive bargaining authority ought to protect.
Despite the apparent threat of the Sadlowski decision, its precedential
value for cases involving members' dissent may be limited. Its facts involved
the content-neutral regulation of nonmember speech. Under the circum-
stances, its holding may have limited relevance to section 101(a)(2) cases.
Nevertheless, its explicit interpretation of the section's proviso looms over all
criticism and dissent within unions. The Court needs to clarify its holding to
guarantee members the freedom from reprisal Congress intended the
LMRDA to provide them.
Cheryl Ann Kettler
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